Reversing the New Wave of Autocratization

Until recently, many OECD countries, as well as the European Union, sponsored programmes aimed at democracy promotion. The purpose of these programmes was to support the ‘forces of democracy’ in countries of the Global South as part of their development assistance efforts. Such programmes were embedded in broader notions of ‘good governance’ which emphasized principles such as accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and the rule of law as the ‘next level’ of political rule.

As part of democracy promotion activities, USAID (the US Agency for International Development) sponsored a variety of programmes across the Global South aimed at electoral assistance, judicial reform and support for the strengthening of civil society. The European Union provided support, among others through the European Development Fund and some more specific programmes, e.g., the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the European Endowment for Democracy and a variety of anti-corruption initiatives. Individual countries, such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands likewise funded programmes that aimed to strengthen democracy and the rule of law in their partner countries in the Global South. Organizations such as the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD), the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in the UK, the Friedrich Ebert and Konrad Adenauer Foundations (both in Germany) and the US-based National Endowment for Democracy received substantial amounts of government funding to work on democratic governance, political participation and civil society abroad, from Eastern Europe to Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Shifting priorities and the retreat of democracy support

While the spending of official development assistance (ODA) by the OECD countries reached a peak in 2022, changes in foreign policy and aid reflect different priorities. Aid to Ukraine has been one factor in the crowding out of development assistance to countries in the Global South. An increased share of the aid budgets of OECD countries has been used to cover the costs of migration policies. In several countries, including the Netherlands and the UK, aid policies have become increasingly geared towards supporting private-sector and other economic activities abroad. The frontal attack of the Trump administration on international cooperation as a foreign-policy tool has resulted in the abolition of USAID. As a consequence of these trends in foreign and development assistance, the support for democracy-enhancing activities has waned in many countries that previously were the champions in this domain.

The IDS report Where’s the Demos in Democracy? is not just an analysis of the contemporary threats to democracy – it is also a call to action, particularly as it relates to providing more space for people (the ‘demos’ in the title of the report) to become involved in democratic practices, among other things through active citizenship, civil society and strengthened accountability mechanisms. The report also specifies a role for donors to support democratization efforts. Aid is a step in the right direction, but it is not a panacea. The strengthening of democracy worldwide cannot be left to the agencies for development cooperation; this process needs to be embedded in broader foreign-policy priorities of countries that are concerned about democracy.

Where is the Demos? Lessons from the Global South

The launch of the IDS report took place during a joint IDS–ISS event on 30 March 2026, with speakers from the political, academic and civil society arena. One of the foci of the panel was on what lessons could be learned from the Global South, as also in the Global North democracy is increasingly under pressure. Marianna Belalba, a lawyer from Venezuela and senior advisor at the European Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, focused on the importance of the politics of hope. She explained that, even 20 years after democracy in Venezuela was crushed, the young generation – even without knowing what it exactly entails – is still aspiring to it. As long as this hope is not erased, and even nurtured, the flame of democracy is kept alive and might set in motion a large pro-democracy movement once there is a little opening. The lesson is that perseverance is needed, even though dangers are associated with it. Belalba shared another important takeaway from her analysis of why certain pro-democracy coalitions succeed and others fail. The most important success factor in whether movements see their appeal improve is if they understand that they do not need to agree about everything. What they do need to agree on is that they need a safe space in which to disagree.

The panellists also discussed one of the key findings of the IDS report, namely that ‘democracy support matters... sometimes’. Democracy support was found to be more likely to be effective if it was part of a broader foreign policy by donor governments: financial support, coupled with a diplomatic push was quintessential, as examples from the 1990s showed. In those examples, the political dialogue that accompanied debt relief was found to be important to push through the political opening of the day. But also the way in which democracy support was provided proved important; e.g., the funding needs to be flexible, as rapid financing is needed to seize the moment of democratic openings (such as in Bangladesh). Also, the need to support grassroots and social movements alongside formal institutions was found to be important (for example, Gen Z–led movements in Kenya).

Supporting democratization in the ' strong man’ era

Reversing the current wave of autocratization will therefore require more than rhetorical commitment or technocratic democracy aid. It demands a renewed political choice by governments in the Global North to place democracy at the heart of their foreign and development policies, and to recognize the central role of the demos itself. At a moment when democratic decline is accelerating worldwide, it is particularly unwise for donors to scale back financial support for democracy programmes or to relegate democratic principles to the margins of their foreign policy objectives. The lessons emerging from the IDS report and the ISS–IDS panel point in the same direction: democracy is sustained through hope, coalitions that allow for principled disagreement and timely, flexible support that strengthens both institutions and social movements. If donors and policymakers are serious about halting – and ultimately reversing – the erosion of democratic rule, they will need to move beyond fragmented projects and short-term priorities and instead invest patiently to keep the hope alive when there is no opening and seize the opportunity when the occasion arises.