Tackling Autocratization in the Post-Huntington Era

Resistance has been both swift and – to paraphrase the Milk Tea Alliance, an Asian pro-democracy movement linking activists across several countries – as contagious as authoritarianism itself. From Burkina Faso, Mali, Madagascar, Niger, Kenya, Senegal, Sudan through Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Indonesia, Sri Lanka to Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela, especially youth and women are rising as democracy’s strongest defenders. Allied with civil society organizations, they are championing resistance while leveraging technology to share tactics across borders.

Despite this pushback, autocratization persists as even previously foolproof democracies – and models – are sliding sharply. The US is now seen as pivoting dangerously towards a dictatorship[2] or witnessing serious democratic decline (Freedom House 2026:3; Bright Line Watch 2026). In Europe, Croatia, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK have gained autocratizer status (V-Dem Institute 2026:4).[3] This reality increases the urgency of two interrelated questions: how can we best respond? What adaptations are needed to ensure effectiveness? But first, what does contemporary autocratization look like?

Beyond bullets

Assaults on democracy have classically been through violent coups d‘état. Recent trends especially in Africa show this is still partly true – just with less bloodshed.[4] However, autocratization is also taking more insidious forms. Most common is the constitutional coup where power grabs are done by exploiting legal loopholes. Though grounded in law, most are unpopular and illegitimate. A key example in the post-Huntington era is the removal or relaxation of constitutional term limits –  a major acquis of third wave democratization. Africa accounts for the highest number. Between 2001 and 2020, presidential term limits were modified at least 24 times across 18 countries –  from Algeria and Egypt in the north, through Cameroon and Gabon in the centre, to Cote d’Ivoire and Togo in the west (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2024; Good Governance Africa 2023). By our count within the same period, term limit changes occurred only 10 times across eight Latin American countries [5] and four times in Eurasia.[6]

Subtle autocratization also includes sham elections, suppression of independent media,  disinformation, AI misuse, politicized civil service, co-opting and weakening opposition parties, curbing civil liberties, expanding executive power and packing courts. Unchecked, these erode democracy overtime. As indicated, current developments, notably in the US, show that autocratization transcends the north-south divide. What therefore must be done differently to tackle this?

Recalibrating resistance

In a multipolar order where China and Russia are offering alternative cooperation models framed on respect for state sovereignty, non interference and equal partnership – but which in reality only sustains autocratization – a fundamental shift in thinking and action is critical.

From Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Sudan, etc, the lesson is that youth engagement, combined with strategic mobilization, planning and coalition-building with civil society and grassroots movements is most effective in resisting autocracy and triggering change. NIMD’s own experience confirms this. In military-ruled Mali, NIMD helped establish and support the Comité de Plaidoyer et de Suivi des Réformes Électorales (CPSRE), a predominantly civic-based platform. The CPSRE successfully advocated for the adoption of 19 out of 25 priority recommendations into the Constitution of 2023, strengthening the civic space against all odds (NIMD 2026a: 3, 62). In Colombia, 23 young people were elected to the Chamber of Representatives in 2022, linked to the 'Ocupar La Política' mentoring programme (id.). These examples demonstrate the value of doubling investment in informal institutions and actors, notably CSOs and youth movements over just supporting formal institutions (which are often already compromised).

Second, tackling contemporary autocratization requires more proactiveness. This means identifying and addressing early threats before they crystallize into systemic democratic breakdown. Thus, rather than responding after constitutional manipulation, advocates should support local activists capable of acting at critical inflection points. For donors and bilateral partners, this means creative leverage of soft power while being mindful not to legitimize autocratization in the process. For technical assistance providers, equipping activists with key capabilities is crucial. NIMD’s democracy schools not only train young democratic leaders, the skills and knowledge they gain from this can be crucial in spotting early signs of decay.

Third, there must be a deliberate effort to protect and expand civic space, on- and offline. As autocrats scale disinformation, supporting independent media and fact-checking initiatives and regulating AI become critical to safeguard democracy.

Additionally, it is crucial that the EU and its member states boldly uphold democratic values and the rule of law. Soft power has the greatest chance of success when anchored in moral high ground. As shown, that is in short supply at the moment, particularly with increased autocratization in the US and some EU countries.

Adapting for optimization

Beyond recalibrating resistance, ensuring effectiveness is imperative. In the current landscape, this demands adaptation. For NIMD, it generally means fluid – and context-driven rather than linear –  programming that align with our values. It also implies avoiding the one-size-fits all trap and grounding actions in local realties and leadership, to enhance ownership, legitimacy and acceptance. Prior political economy analysis unpacking dynamics that shape behaviour should therefore inform programme design.

Adapting for optimization also requires flexible understanding of progress. This means adopting criteria that define change based on what is feasible within a given context. Insights from independent evaluations of two NIMD initiatives – the Power of Dialogue (PoD) and Leap4Peace programmes – implemented from 2021 to 2025 (NIMD 2026a: 3, 47; NIMD 2026b: 3-6, 16) confirm this. Thus, in Burundi, Colombia and Myanmar success was not seen as linear advancement into formal political roles for women.

Instead, change was reflected in the programme’s ability to maintain engagement in difficult conditions: sustaining presence amid ongoing risks in Colombia, preventing total withdrawal in Burundi’s severely contracted political space and encouraging participation through adaptation post-coup in Myanmar (NIMD 2026b: 7).

Lastly, evidence shows autocrats are coordinating actions. The Action for Democracy’s Authoritarian Collaboration Index has mapped over 72,000 initiatives since 2024 of autocrats networking, learning and institutionalizing their cooperation (Action for Democracy n.d.: 2). Effectively countering this requires more cross-border learning and solidarity. Thus, as autocratization becomes increasingly networked, so should democracy support through transnational exchanges of strategies, tools and experiences. NIMD’s multi-country engagements have shown that peer learning – particularly among youth and women – can accelerate the diffusion of democratic practices and strengthen collective resilience.

Conclusion

In sum, tackling autocratization in the post-Huntington era demands not only recalibration of resistance but also reinvention. As autocracy evolves with more sophisticated tactics, so too must resistance strategies – grounded in local agency, proactive engagement and global solidarity. By empowering youth and protecting civic space and an independent media, we can still reclaim momentum and safeguard democracy’s future in an increasingly autocratizing world.

Disclaimer: The views expressed represent the authors positions on the subject, not necessarily that of NIMD.